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GERMANY AFTER UNIFICATION (1990)
At a meeting in Ottawa, Canada, on 13 February 1990, the foreign ministers of the four major World War II allies and those of the two Germanies agreed on a framework for negotiating the unification of Germany. The dominant partner in the transaction was the Federal Republic, which had a population of 61 million, compared with less than 17 million for the Democratic Republic, a much greater national product in convertible currency, and a well-established, freely elected government. The proposals to unite the two Germanies faced formidable external and internal problems (Asmus 1990; Bertram 1990 ). In general, the two Germanies in concert with the four World War II powers dealt with the external problems; agreement about the eastern boundary of the new Germany involved Poland as well. Internal problems were within the competence of the two Germanies to decide.
EXTERNAL PROBLEMS
Major external problems were posed by the international boundaries of the new Germany and by its strategic alliances, the size of its military forces, and the continued presence of foreign troops in its territory. The German Democratic Republic had been a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). The Federal Republic was a member of the European Community, as is the newly united country. The economy of East Germany faces not only difficult, painful adjustments but also new opportunities.
The first problem was that of international boundaries. In the absence of a peace treaty ending World War II, no agreement existed about the boundaries of Germany. Indeed, the constitution of the Federal Republic specifically stated that the boundaries were those of 1937. The large number of residents in West Germany who had been expelled from former German lands now occupied by the Soviet Union and by Poland represented a political force of some strength within the Federal Republic. After initial hesitation and equivocation by the federal chancellor in January 1990, the Bundestag in the Federal Republic and the Volkskammer in the Democratic Republic on 21 June 1990 adopted matching resolutions that gave formal recognition to the new eastern boundary with Poland and explicit assurances to Poland (Unity of Germany 1990). Germany thus relinquished claims to 114,549 square kilometers of prewar territory east of the Oder and Neisse rivers.
At a meeting in Paris on 17 July 1990, the foreign ministers of the four wartime allies, the two Germanies, and Poland settled the boundary question. The united Germany would remove from its laws any language that suggested or implied that the Polish-German border is provisional. The newly unified country would comprise only East and West Germany and Berlin. The parliament of the unified Germany would confirm the Oder-Neisse line in treaty and would forswear any territorial claim. The wartime allies would serve as witnesses to these assurances. On 14 November 1990, the German and Polish foreign ministers signed a treaty guaranteeing the current border between Poland and Germany. The prime minister of Poland then asked for the forgiveness of the German nation for the sufferings that were caused by moving Poland from east to west, as a result of Soviet annexation of the eastern portion of Poland, its compensation with prewar German territory east of the Oder-Neisse rivers, and the division of East Prussia between Poland and the Soviet Union.
These territories may now have less strategic significance than they once had for Germany. The German inhabitants were largely expelled in 1945.
They and their descendants have lived for forty-five years in the postwar Germanies and have contributed to their economy and life. It is not known how many might have wished to return to their former homes and occupations had that been possible. Advanced industrialized countries produce agricultural surpluses for a larger population on a much reduced area with far fewer farmers but with politically sensitive subsidies. Even the relative importance of the old centers of coal mining and heavy industry, such as Upper Silesia (Hartshorne 1934 ) and the Ruhr (Harris 1946) , has been reduced in the modern era of high technology and the growth of the service sector. Some of the heavy-industrial areas that once formed the sinews of German power in both East and West Germany are now depressed, relative to new, rapidly growing industrial areas of high technology in southern West Germany (Lavrov 1989 ). Population; a well-educated, highly trained, hardworking, and motivated labor force; accumulated capital in the form of productive facilities; and a high level of technology, economy, and culture now appear to be far more significant than mere area.
Among the military problems that confronted the reunification effort, international alliances presented difficult questions. East Germany had been a member of the Warsaw Pact, which was dominated by the Soviet Union. West Germany was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Numerous proposals were offered for continuing or modifying German participation in these alliances. Ultimately on 16 July 1990, the Soviet Union withdrew its opposition to NATO membership for the united Germany. At that time the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union reached an accord that, during the transition period, the military forces of NATO or German forces assigned to it would not be stationed in East German territory. It was also agreed then that the size of the military forces of the united Germany would be reduced to 370,000, less than the previous levels of 490,000 for the Federal Republic and 100,000 for the Democratic Republic The extraordinary and unanticipated speed in international agreement on the merging of Germany was based on the perception of all the major powers that the people of the two Germanies desired unification. The agreement was also a consequence of numerous bilateral and multilateral discussions and summit conferences among the heads of state and the foreign ministers of all involved countries. The number and frequency of these consultations resulted from rapid jet-airline travel and international communication networks, which enabled all the leaders to become well acquainted with each other and to understand the diverse viewpoints and concerns of each country. Thus the NATO powers were well informed about the special concerns of the Soviet Union and Poland and were willing and able to adjust policies to alleviate the concerns, for example, by issuing a statement that NATO no longer considered the Soviet Union an adversary. West German leaders on numerous occasions acknowledged German responsibility and regret for sufferings inflicted during the Nazi period.
Although the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union officially approved of German unification, individuals in each country, recalling former German military power and the inhumanity of the Nazi period, were uneasy about a united Germany. People in the Soviet Union, which had suffered heavy losses of life and property during World War II, were especially apprehensive. Larger numbers, especially government leaders, emphasized that the contemporary world involves different persons, different times, different attitudes, and a greatly changed international situation, with stress on democracy, free enterprise, social caring, rule of law, international cooperation, and European integration (Sommer 1990 ).
In contrast to external impediments, the two German governments dealt with the internal problems of unification. Economic, political, social, and judicial differences had to be reconciled in negotiations. Other problems included the high levels of environmental pollution and industrial hazards in East Germany.
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Among the economic and financial problems of unification were the differences in the value of the West German and East German currencies, dissimilar price levels, and contrasting competitiveness of industries and agriculture. To make East German industry competitive, massive investments in modernization will be required; such investments will need secure property rights.
A treaty between the two Germanies on 18 May 1990 addressed economic and financial matters (Gesetz 1990; Unity of Germany 1990). Agreement was reached that on 1 July 1990 the Federal Republic would exchange, within certain limits, valuable, convertible West German marks for the less valuable, nonconvertible East German marks. This exchange represented a substantial subsidy to East Germany. The transaction was well planned and went smoothly. Fears of possible inflationary pressures proved unfounded, because East Germans, worried about high prices and possible unemployment, generally saved their new marks. The Federal Republic also agreed to assume responsibility for the financial and contractual trade obligations of East Germany. Thus the first stage of economic union was quickly achieved (New York Times 1 July 1990).
Profound differences in price levels also separated the two Germanies. On the one hand, some basic foodstuffs and housing were heavily subsidized in East Germany, so that prices were low. Removal of those subsidies posed the problem of price rises and accompanying hardship in East Germany. On the other hand, prices, quality, and availability of many consumer goods, such as television sets, refrigerators, and automobiles, were much improved in East Germany after the currency exchange. Formerly protected producers of low-quality, inexpensive consumer items in East Germany saw the market for their wares almost completely disappear. The East German economy, based on state ownership, directed by a national economic plan and government ministries, and oriented toward other members of COMECON under arranged exchanges or barters, faces the daunting problem of being competitive in the open-market economy of the Federal Republic, the European Community, and the world at large.
Agriculture also presented hurdles. Farmers in East Germany, forced against their will into collectives during the. 1950s, had become accustomed to the regular working hours, vacation time, pensions, and social centers provided by the collectives. With economic union, better-graded and betterpackaged West German products displaced many East German items in the markets. The East German farmers received the equivalent of approximately U.S.$3.5 billion in subsidies from the former East German government. Now, faced with stiff competition, they are demanding higher subsidies. But the pending economic unification of the European Community could actually reduce both farm subsidies and the area under cultivation.
Widespread unemployment is anticipated in East Germany both during the transition period and afterward, but the Federal Republic has agreed to provide benefits to ease the consequences of economic change. The automobile industry illustrates problems of investment and employment. The Trabant automobile factory, the prewar Audi plant in Zwichau that was nationalized after World War II, had 11,000 workers in 1989 and produced 146,000 cars with a motorcycle-size, twenty-six-horsepower, two-cylinder motor, with a maximum speed of sixty miles per hour, which is slow by West German standards, and with air-pollutant levels ten times higher than from western-made cars. In the absence of other available automobiles, there was a waiting period of fourteen years for customers to receive deliveries of new Trabants. With the introduction of West German convertible marks, the demand for Trabants has dropped precipitously. Volkswagen announced in March 1990 a joint venture with Trabant to invest U.S.$1.9 billion to produce in a nearby plant at Mosel, East Germany, almost twice as many highly salable Volkswagens with only about half the labor force, but production is not likely to begin until 1993 or to reach full capacity until 1996. Meantime, workers at the Trabant factory face massive unemployment. To handle the huge losses, the management has asked for large governmental subsidies. Altogether, Volkswagen plans to invest U.S.$3 billion in East Germany. Other West German companies planning large investments there include Daimler-Benz, which will spend U.S.$600 million to modernize the largest truck factory; Siemens A.G., which will pay out U.S.$625 million to employ 25,000 workers in telecommunications, computers, and related fields; and Deutsche Bank, which plans to invest more than U.S.$500 million to establish 250 branches.
Massive investment in communications, railroads, highways, and utilities is also urgently needed. The ordinary tourist immediately notices the absence of computerized reservation systems for accommodations and the rudimen- By virtually all indicators West Germans were much better off economically than were East Germans, but the social-welfare programs were more comprehensive for the latter than for the former. The programs included job security, old-age benefits, health care, maternity leave, and day-care centers. One expression of this was the success of East Germany in rapidly reducing infant mortality through the 1970s (Berentsen 1987 West German civil and criminal law was to be applied in East Germany, except in cases where special rules or exemptions were decreed for a transition period. The 1,700 judges in East Germany were replaced, at least until their cases can be reviewed, by West German ones on 3 October 1990. The legal status of abortion was a difficult issue: it had been available on demand in East Germany but was restricted in West Germany. In spite of contrasting legal status, the rate of abortions in the two areas had not been strikingly different: about one pregnancy in four in East Germany in 1989 and an estimated one in five or six in West Germany (New York Times 19 July 1990).
POLLUTION AND INDUSTRIAL HAZARDS
Environmental pollution presents an intractable problem. West German environmental laws had been quite strict, but pollution in East Germany was virtually ignored in the drive for the highest possible industrial output. As a result, pollution by the lignite and chemical industries is horrendous. But antipollution measures are very expensive and may be difficult for a competitively weak industry to bear. Also, some food products in East Germany contain high levels of contamination by pesticides and other chemicals long since banned in West Germany.
Safety is a concern in some East German industries. In mid-December 1990, the German government decided to shut down five Soviet-built nuclearpower reactors in former East Germany. Four of them were at Greifswald on the Baltic Sea coast and one was at Rheinsberg. Each was a Soviet VVER model 230 with 440-megawatt capacity. They were designed in the 1960s and were built in the 1970s. The government concluded that the plants failed to meet minimum safety standards and cited poor maintenance, low-quality materials, inadequate fire protection, deficient cooling systems, and lack of a containment system (New York Times 21 October 1990). In the evolving association of the countries of Europe, the new Germany appears poised to play an important role. First, it has a central position. All principal west-east railroad lines north of the Alps cross German territory (Murphy 1991). Hamburg, long the leading port of central Europe, is likely to benefit greatly from the dropping of barriers that truncate its natural hinterland (Weigend 1956 ). Second, in this part of the world, Germany has by far the largest population of any country except the Soviet Union. Third, West Germany has emerged as the leading economic power in Europe and the deutsche mark as the strongest currency. The addition of East Germany brings not only the problems of an inefficient, noncompetitive economy but also the potential for increased productivity through capital investment, improved management, and a better-motivated labor force.
As unification moved rapidly, Germany began to assume a larger role in the European Community, in NATO, in the deliberations of the Group of Seven world industrial democracies, and in the Conference on Security and Cooperation. It appears that the new Germany will become the principal trading partner of the Soviet Union and that Berlin will once again be the cultural and economic hub of central Europe.
